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“The Road Goes on Forever And the Party Never Ends”1:

A Response to Judge Tacoma’s Prescription
for a Return to Foster Care “Limbo” and
“Drift”
by Frank E. Vandervort, JD
Wexford County Probate Judge Kenneth Tacoma
has written a thought-provoking article that brings
attention to a very real problem: the excessive number
of youth who are permanent wards but who have no
realistic hope for adoption or other permanent plan.
We should all thank him for encouraging a serious
discussion about what to do about this problem. But
the Judge’s prescription for addressing this important
consequence of current child welfare law is ultimately

unconvincing. If his suggestions are followed—and
it appears that they have been taken seriously by the
Michigan Supreme Court, which quietly convened a
task force to look into making recommendations for
policy changes as a result of Judge Tacoma’s concerns—Michigan would most likely return to the days
of foster care “limbo” and foster care “drift.”
We haven’t heard those terms much for the past
two decades, but it would be wise for our policy mak-
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ers to investigate and ensure that they fully understand
them and their implications before forging ahead with
Judge Tacoma’s proposals. Judge Tacoma mentions, in
passing, the concept of “limbo” but does not describe
the very real problem it presented to children stuck in
a foster care system that would not make a decision.
He fails to even mention the problem of “drift,” which
was closely associated with the idea of “limbo.” Much
discussed in the 1970s, foster care “limbo” described
the temporary status of foster children in the days
before the enactment of the Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act of 1980, the federal government’s
ﬁrst legislative eﬀort to reform the nation’s foster care
system. “Drift,” was used to describe the phenomenon
of children moving from foster home to foster home
or “drifting” through the system. Cleary, these phenomena still exist, but if Judge Tacoma’s recommendations become law, they will be the oﬃcial policy of the
state of Michigan.
This article responds to Judge Tacoma’s suggested
changes in Michigan law. It begins with a very brief
history of child welfare legislation at the federal and
state levels. Next, it points out a number of errors in
Judge Tacoma’s understanding of the current state of
Michigan’s child welfare law.2 It is necessary to point
out these errors because it seems that his misstatements of the law form the foundation for his recommended reforms. Then it will respond point-by-point
to many of Judge Tacoma’s recommendations. Finally,
I will oﬀer several suggestions for addressing the problem of legal orphans that do not require legislative or
policy changes, but would require that we make significant changes in the way child welfare law is practiced
in this state.

A Brief History
Child welfare is an area of the law that seems to
have been particularly vulnerable to pendulum swings
as policymakers have tried to develop a set of rules
to address an inﬁnite variety of exceedingly complex
problems of human functioning. Before 1980, children
entered the foster care system and very often there they
stayed. Stayed, that is, until they were someday released
from foster care on their own. Perhaps at some point
they were returned to the custody of their natural parents, but there was no requirement that they were to be
returned or that an alternative permanent plan be made
for them, and state law diﬀered widely on these issues.
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Children routinely spent their entire childhoods
in “temporary” foster care. For example, in 1977 the
United States Supreme Court decided Smith v Organization for Foster Families for Equality and Reform,3
in which it was called on to delineate the constitutional rights of foster parents who had parented foster
children for many years. The children at issue in that
case had lived with their foster parents for as long as
10 years. Similarly, Santosky v Kramer,4 in which the
Supreme Court addressed the standard of evidence
required by the constitution before a parent’s rights
could be terminated, involved three children. One entered foster care in November 1973, the other two in
about September 1974. The state moved to terminate
parental rights for the ﬁrst time in September 1976,
but the trial court rejected the state’s eﬀort. The state
again sought termination of parental rights in October
1978. Such long stays in “temporary” foster care were
not at all unusual in those days.
If these long stays in foster care were not bad
enough, children were frequently moved from foster home to foster home. Our current child welfare
system still struggles with stability. But in those days,
before the federal government stepped in with ﬁnancial incentives to stop the practice, many states moved
children as a matter of policy whenever they grew
emotionally close to their foster parents.
In response to children’s long stays in the uncertainty of temporary foster care, the federal government
enacted the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare
Act of 1980 (AACWA). The AACWA established a
funding scheme that sought to achieve three main
goals: 1) reducing the numbers of children entering
foster care by mandating that “reasonable eﬀorts”
be made to prevent the removal of children from
their natural parents’ custody; 2) the expediting of
children’s movement through the foster care system by,
among other things, requiring states to make “reasonable eﬀorts” to reunify children with their natural
parents and establishing a requirement of permanency
planning hearings after the child had been in care for
18 months; and 3) providing federal funding assistance to encourage adoption of those children who
could not be returned home.
In response to the AACWA, in 1988 Michigan
overhauled its Juvenile Code. Those revisions were
based on the ﬁndings of the Coleman Commission,
which was chaired by then Supreme Court Justice
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Mary Coleman, and were commonly referred to as the
Stabenow legislation for then-State Senator Debbie
Stabenow, the primary sponsor of the reform legislation. Among other things, the Stabenow reforms
required “reasonable eﬀorts” before children could be
removed from their homes and, once removed, before
the court could terminate parental rights. That legislation led Michigan to establish Families First and similar programs in an eﬀort to preserve families and stem
the tide of children entering the foster care system.
The Stabenow reforms—as was the federal law—
were widely misunderstood. It became the typical
interpretation that every conceivable eﬀort to prevent
foster placement or to reunify a family had to be
made. As a result, many children were harmed by the
reluctance to remove them from abusive and neglectful parents. On the national level, the case of Joshua
DeShaney, a 4-year-old boy who was severely beaten
and brain damaged at the hands of his father while
the state’s child welfare workers took notes, is but one
example of the way family preservation programs were
misused.5 Some children died.6
Many more children remained stuck in foster care
“limbo” despite eﬀorts to move them through the foster care system and either back home to their parents
or on to alternative permanent homes. In 1998, in In
re Sherman,7 a panel of the Michigan Court of Appeals
expressed its exasperation with the slowness of child
welfare proceedings in this way:
[T]he basic facts and procedural history of this
matter are part and parcel of the sadly familiar
litany of parental neglect and failure, substance
abuse, behavioral problems, and tortuous and
prolonged legal proceedings that so often characterize parental rights termination cases. At
the outset of such cases, one may well wonder
whether the state is justiﬁed in proposing the
ominously ﬁnal step of terminating parental
rights; at the conclusion, one can only wonder
what took so long.
Because it believed its intent in enacting the
AACWA was misunderstood, in 1997 Congress
enacted the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA).
Broadly speaking, ASFA had the same three goals
as the AACWA: to reduce the number of children
entering foster care, to move children who are in the
system into permanent homes in a timeframe that is
consistent with children’s developmental needs, and to
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promote the adoption of children from the foster care
system. Additionally, Congress sought to clarify its
intention with regard to the application of the “reasonable eﬀorts” requirement making explicit that the
interests of children in safety and permanency are the
system’s paramount considerations.8 ASFA was signed
into law in late 1997, and the ﬁrst wave of the Binsfeld legislation was signed into law in December of
that year; a second package of bills was signed into law
by the governor in December of 1998. With Binsfeld,
Michigan met or, in some cases, accelerated the ASFA
timelines.
With only minor variations, this is where our law
stands today.

Misunderstanding the Law
Before turning to the policy recommendations
Judge Tacoma suggests, it is necessary to address the
misunderstandings of the law reﬂected in his article.
In a very fundamental way, his article communicates
a misunderstanding of Michigan law as it relates to
termination of parental rights, which leads to faulty
conclusions about how to address the problem of legal
orphans.
Permanency Planning Hearings After One Year

Judge Tacoma ﬁrst asserts that the “one-year rule”
contained in Mich. Comp. Laws § 712A.19a contributes to the excessive use of termination of parental rights. The operative provision of Section 19a is
subparagraph 5. He argues that this provision of the
law makes termination of parental rights “the default
option” and “the mandated case plan if a child remains
in foster care for one year after initial placement.”9
But a careful analysis of the most salient portions
of that provision demonstrates that this is not the case
at all. The ﬁrst sentence of subsection (5) reads: “If
parental rights to the child have not been terminated
and the court determines at a permanency planning
hearing that the return of the child to his or her parent would not cause a substantial risk of harm to the
child’s life, physical health, or mental well-being, the
court shall order the child returned to his or her parent.” Clearly, then, the preference articulated in the
statute is not a default to termination, but the precise opposite, a default for return of the child to the
parent’s custody unless the court ﬁnds a “substantial
risk of harm” exists.
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In a child protection case that reaches the stage
that 19b(5) applies, the parent will have been shown
to have abused or neglected the child. He or she will
have been given as much as a year to engage in services
aimed at assisting the parent to regain custody. Yet
despite these eﬀorts, the court must still ﬁnd that the
child would be at a “substantial risk of harm” before
the court may take any action other than returning
the child to parental custody. So, after having been
at least once victimized by the parent and forced to
uproot his or her life to live with relatives or strangers
and waiting around for a period of time that might be
his or her entire life, at the end of one year, the child
shoulders the risk of harm unless that risk is deemed
“substantial” by the court. This seems a more than fair
eﬀort to balance the interests of parents with those of
their children.10
The statute goes on in an eﬀort to level this shouldering of the burden. It provides: “In determining
whether the return of the child would cause a substantial risk of harm to the child, the court shall view the
failure of the parent to substantially comply with the
terms and conditions of the case service plan . . . as
evidence that return of the child to his or her parent
would cause a substantial risk of harm to the child’s
life, physical health, or mental well-being.” That is,
unless the parent has made real and consistent eﬀorts
to improve his or her parenting capacity—which was
previously found to be below the minimum acceptable
level after the application of full due process procedures—the law will assume that the parent continues to be unﬁt. Where the parent has “substantially
complied,” he or she has produced evidence that she is
no longer unﬁt to parent the child.11 This assumption
that a parent who has not complied with the ordered
services continues to be unﬁt seems more than reasonable given the large amount of assistance oﬀered to the
parent in the form of various treatment programs and
casework services.
It is unfortunately true that some parents—perhaps many more than we are willing to admit—are
simply incapable of being helped, regardless of how
much assistance they are provided, in anything like a
reasonable time when we take into consideration the
needs of their children.12 Anyone who has done child
welfare work for any length of time has likely been involved in a case in which a parent with long-standing
mental health problems (which may include numerous psychiatric hospitalizations), or a serious substance
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abuse problem, insists on residing with a partner who
abuses both her and her children.
These cases are often complicated by the presence of poverty. And this co-morbidity is routinely
encountered in child welfare practice. How can we
possibly untangle such a knot in a year—or two or
three years for that matter? And what should we do
with the children of these families while their parents
struggle with their problems? We cannot simply place
children into a state of suspended animation. They
grow; they develop attachments to other adults; to
ensure their well-being, children need a stable primary
attachment ﬁgure and a sense of long-term stability.
While our child welfare system too often falls short of
our goal that children have a stable family life within a
reasonable time, taking into consideration the particular child’s developmental needs, enacting many of
Judge Tacoma’s suggestions into law would make these
unfortunate outcomes the oﬃcial policy of the state, a
policy that has been tried and that demonstrably does
not serve the interests of children.
Of course, the application of the “one-year rule”
doesn’t really mean that children must wait only a
year for permanency or that parents are oﬀered only
one year of services in an eﬀort to regain custody of
their children. If we assume that the child has been
in care for one year and the court holds the required
permanency planning hearing at that time, neither
the child’s hunt for permanency nor the obligation
to provide services to the parent is done. The child
welfare road is long, and the child has only just begun
his journey.
The Trejo case provides a convenient example for
understanding how the system actually works. In
Trejo, after the parent rejected the agency’s eﬀorts to
preserve her family, the agency ﬁled a petition and the
trial court held a preliminary hearing on May 2, 1995.
The court authorized the petition and ordered the
children removed from parental custody. Later that
month, the parents entered a plea. The children were
initially placed with relatives and were replaced into
foster homes in October 1995. The court held various review hearings. A permanency planning hearing
(PPH) was held June 12, 1996, more than 13 months
after they were removed from parental custody. It took
another month, until July 12, 1996, for the agency to
actually ﬁle the termination petition, this was actually
expeditious because under the law the agency has 42
days to ﬁle if ordered to do so at the PPH.13 The court
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held numerous days of hearings on the petition, but
not until December 2, 1996, did the court enter its
order actually terminating parental rights.
These timeframes are not at all atypical, particularly
in our more urban jurisdictions where the vast majority
of this state’s child welfare cases are heard. As this case
demonstrates, the so-called “one-year rule” can regularly
stretch to 18 months or two years. The Trejo children’s
search for a permanent home wasn’t, of course, over at
that point. The appeals began. In Trejo, the Michigan
Court of Appeals issued its opinion aﬃrming the termination of parental rights on June 12, 1998, a year-anda-half after the termination. Fortunately, due to steps
to expedite these cases, it currently takes about a year
for a child welfare case to be decided by the Michigan
Court of Appeals. The kids remain in “limbo” while
this process takes place.14 The Michigan Supreme Court
issued its opinion in Trejo on July 5, 2000, some ﬁve
years and two months after the Trejo children’s saga of
“temporary” foster care placement began.
Clearly the “one year rule” doesn’t mean a year for
the children involved. It most often means substantially more, and it may mean their entire lifetime!
Judge Tacoma laments that the “one-year rule”
requires a movement in the direction of termination
“even if other options (such as continued work with
the parent(s) on a case service plan, long-term foster
care or long-term relative placement) might be available for consideration.” I will address each of these
three options in turn.
First, the mere fact that the statute may require in
some cases that the agency pursue termination after
one year from the child’s entry into the system, does
not mean that services stop at that point. Indeed,
Michigan law seems to require that services continue
until the court actually terminates parental rights.
The Juvenile Code requires the court to put in place
a treatment plan as part of the dispositional order.15
The statute also presumes that those services will be
provided until the court actually terminates parental
rights.16 So, “continued work with the parent(s)” after
the ﬁling of the termination petition is built into the
current scheme for termination of parental rights.
Second, regarding long-term foster care, Judge
Tacoma expresses concern that the court has too few
options for using this means as an alternative to termination of parental rights. I disagree.
The Juvenile Code speciﬁcally grants the court
substantial authority to extend foster care placement
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when doing so will serve a child’s interests:
If the court determines that it is in the child’s
best interests based upon compelling reasons,
the child’s placement in foster care may continue on a long-term basis. 17
This language is designed to comport with the
language of the Adoption and Safe Families Act
(ASFA).18 ASFA generally requires the state to pursue
termination of parental rights when a child has been in
foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months.19 The
federal statute, however, provides three broad exceptions to this requirement: 1) where the child is being
cared for by a relative, 2) where a “compelling reason”
has been documented that ﬁling a petition to terminate
parental rights “would not be in the best interests of
the child,”20 and 3) where the state has not provided
adequate services to meet the reasonable eﬀorts requirement. Moreover, ASFA speciﬁcally grants state courts
broad authority to take whatever action would serve
the child’s interests in individual cases, without suﬀering any negative federal funding consequences, even if
the state’s child welfare agency does not agree with the
action. Thus, 42 U.S.C. § 678 provides:
Nothing in this part [Title IV-E of the social security act] shall be construed as precluding the
State courts from exercising their discretion to
protect the health and safety of children in individual cases, including cases other than those
described in section 671(a)(15)(D).21
Moreover, Michigan’s Juvenile Code speciﬁcally
provides for permanent foster family placement when
that placement would serve the interests of a child
who is 14 years of age or older.22 A child who is placed
pursuant to a permanent foster family agreement
remains under the court’s jurisdiction, and the court
must conduct review hearings at six-month intervals.23
Plainly, the permanent foster family agreement provision establishes, for some children, that foster care is a
permanent placement. Used wisely, these various provisions of law provide the court with broad discretion
to maintain a child in a foster home or other non-relative foster care placement.
Judge Tacoma’s third concern has to do with inadequate statutory authorization to use long-term relative placement when doing so would serve the child’s
interests. Again, I disagree.
As already noted, if the child is placed with a
relative, ASFA does not mandate that the Depart47
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ment of Human Services ﬁle a termination petition,
even where the child has been in foster care for 15 of
the most recent 22 months,24 and it grants the court
broad decision-making authority with regard to the
child’s placement.25 So there is no federal funding prohibition against the extension of “temporary” placement with a relative.
Michigan law is consistent with the federal law.
The Juvenile Code, court rules,26 and Department
of Human Services policy27 all strongly favor relative placement. Moreover, the legislature has recently
expanded the deﬁnition of a “relative” to open additional placement resources for children.28
In the appropriate case, the court has the authority
to grant legal guardianship to a relative or to another
adult whom the court determines can provide adequately for the child.29 To ensure maximum ﬂexibility
in ensuring the child’s safety, the statute speciﬁcally
permits the court to dismiss the child protection
proceeding when guardianship has been granted or to
keep the child protection proceeding open.30
Even if a case is not resolved by granting a guardianship to a relative, the Juvenile Code contemplates
that relative placement under the court’s supervision
may constitute a permanent placement. Thus, the statute provides: “If a child is under the care and supervision of the agency and is . . . placed with a relative and
the placement is intended to be permanent . . . the
court shall hold a review hearing not more than” every
six months.31
Taken together with the court’s broad authority to
amend or supplement its orders “within the authority
granted to the court in section 18”32 of the Juvenile
Code, the court has a great deal of ﬂexibility to craft a
dispositional order that will both provide permanency
to each child and consider the special circumstances of
his or her particular case. In those cases in which none
of these options are suitable, the court may need to
proceed to hearing on a termination of parental rights
petition. But, again, Judge Tacoma seems to misunderstand the law’s requirements.
Section 19b(5) and Trejo

Judge Tacoma’s second major misstatement of the
law involves his understanding of the purpose and
methods of Mich. Comp. Laws § 712A.19b(5)33 and
the Michigan Supreme Court’s Trejo34 decision. His
article repeatedly refers to these sources of law as creat-
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ing a “statutory presumption requiring termination.”
This is simply wrong. The court in Trejo repeatedly rejected the argument that subsection 19b(5) establishes
a presumption in favor of termination. The majority
explained:
reading subsection 19b(5) in its entirety, we
conclude that subsection 19b(5) preserves to
the court the opportunity to ﬁnd that termination is “clearly not in the child’s best interests” despite the establishment of one or more
grounds for termination.
We reject Hall-Smith’s characterization of subsection 19b(5) as creating a rebuttable presumption. . . .35
Rather than create a presumption as Judge Tacoma
asserts, the court elaborated on the purpose of subsection 19b(5), explaining that it “attempts to strike
the diﬃcult balance between the policy favoring the
preservation of the family unit and that of protecting a
child’s right and need for security and permanency.”36
Later in its opinion the court reiterated its conclusion
that subsection 19b(5) creates no presumption:
We conclude that . . . the subsection 19b(5)’s
[sic] best interest provision, in fact, provides an
opportunity for the court to ﬁnd that termination is clearly not in the child’s best interest, despite the establishment of one or more grounds
for termination.37
A careful reading of the Trejo case demonstrates
that while courts have less discretion today in determining not to terminate parental rights than they had
before the 1994 addition of subsection 19b(5), they
retain considerable discretion in making the ﬁnal decision whether to terminate parental rights.38 It must, of
course, be remembered that before the enactment of
subsection 19b(5), judges had the very sort of broad
discretion for which Judge Tacoma again advocates.
It was their failure to exercise that discretion wisely—
which led to vast numbers of children lingering in the
impermanency of “temporary” foster care for years—
that caused the legislature to rein in their discretion.
The judge relies on a related misunderstanding
regarding subsection 19b(5). He asserts that the law
currently shifts the burden to prove the child’s best
interest to the parents or to the children who are the
subject of a request for termination of parental rights.
This, again, is a misreading of subsection 19b(5) as
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interpreted by the court in Trejo. Indeed, the court explicitly rejected the suggestion that subsection 19b(5)
shifts the burden of proof to the parent or, by implication, to the child. The majority wrote:
we hold that under subsection 19b(5), the court
may consider evidence introduced by any party when determining whether termination is
clearly not in the child’s best interest. . . . Thus,
we expressly reject the dicta of In re Boursaw,
239 Mich. App. 161, 180 . . . (2000), that, “if
the parent does not put forth any evidence addressing the issue [of the child’s best interests],
termination is automatic.”39
Later in its opinion, the court reemphasized this
point: “Rather than imposing an impermissible
burden on respondent, the best interest provision of
subsection 19b(5) actually provides an opportunity to
avoid termination, despite the establishment of one or
more grounds for termination.”40
Mandatory Petitions to Terminate Parental Rights

Judge Tacoma asserts that a third provision of the
law contributes to the excessive use of termination of
parental rights, the mandatory ﬁling provisions contained in the Child Protection Law.41 While he recognizes that “in most cases the presence of the kinds
of abuse or neglect enumerated in the statute justiﬁes
and should require termination of parental rights,” he
objects to the legislature’s removal of discretion “from
professionals.”42 I will make two points in regard to
this argument.
First, the law does not remove discretion from
“professionals.” Rather, it shifts discretion from
child welfare professionals employed by the executive branch of government to the judicial branch.
Nothing in the Child Protection Law or the Juvenile
Code requires the court to terminate parental rights
in response to a mandatory petition. Indeed, nothing
in the law requires that the court even authorize such
a petition or approve the request for termination of
parental rights at the initial disposition. In many cases
in which a mandatory termination petition is ﬁled,
the protective services worker states at the preliminary hearing that he or she would not have made the
request for termination but for the statutory mandate,
and the court simply proceeds on the petition as
though it requested temporary custody.
Secondly, it is critical to recall why our Child
Protection Law requires the state child welfare agency
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to ﬁle these mandatory petitions to terminate parental
rights. The Binsfeld Commission’s report articulated
numerous reasons why legislation mandating petitions requesting termination of parental rights at the
ﬁrst disposition was necessary.43 Among those were the
lack of any mechanism within the agency to identify
cases to which the reasonable eﬀorts were not necessary,44 the agency routinely misapplied the reasonable
eﬀorts required so that children were endangered,45
a lack of access to legal counsel on the part of agency
workers; a lack of training for both agency workers and
prosecutors regarding when termination at an initial
dispositional hearing is appropriate, and poor coordination between prosecutors and social workers resulted in
improper preparation and presentation of cases.
As a matter of public policy, it makes little sense
to expend our very limited resources attempting to
rehabilitate parents who rape, batter, torture, kill, or
attempt to kill their children, for this is the very group
of parents least likely to meaningfully beneﬁt from the
application of human services.46 In those rare cases of
this sort in which the parent may beneﬁt from those
services, the court retains discretion to refrain from
terminating parental rights.
Having addressed the three provisions of the law
that Judge Tacoma expresses concern about, I will next
consider his suggested remedies.

Suggestions for Change
Judge Tacoma makes a number of suggestions for
changes to the law to address what he has identiﬁed
as disconcerting. I agree with some of his suggestions;
others are unwise. I will ﬁrst make a few general observations and will then address a number of the speciﬁc
recommendations.
It is important to recognize that no statute, policy,
or practice will solve all the problems presented by
child welfare practice. Even the seemingly simplest
child welfare case is inﬁnitely complex because human
emotions and relations, as the Judge suggests, are
inﬁnitely complex. But it is important to recognize
that every change will have consequences that we do
not intend or that are predictable but undesirable.
The admittedly excessive number of legal orphans in
Michigan’s foster care system is one predictable but
undesirable consequence. So we must make our policy
choices wisely, understanding that there will always be
cases that do not turn out as we would hope.
Unlike Judge Tacoma, I believe that the statutory structure of our child welfare system currently
49

z

The Michigan Child Welfare Law Journal

provides suﬃcient discretion to judges to address this
problem. Conversely, adopting the reforms Judge Tacoma advocates would predictably result in even larger
numbers of children stuck in an unending “limbo” of
the foster care system, “drifting” from placement to
placement, rootless and with no hope of ever having a
family connection.
In his article, the judge relates a number of anecdotes to illustrate his concerns. In each case, he suggests that termination of parental rights was not the
answer. Perhaps he is correct in some of those speciﬁc
cases; he certainly knows those cases much better
than I. But in none of those cases does he suggest
an outcome that would actually improve the child’s
chance for a permanent family, that would ensure
reuniﬁcation with a parent who is even minimally ﬁt
to care for the child, or a standard that would result in
an alternative permanent home for the child. In each
illustration, the result of what he advocates would be a
child stuck in the “limbo” of “temporary” foster care.
Let me now comment on a number of the judge’s
speciﬁc recommendations.
The “One-Year Rule”

I have already addressed how the “one-year rule”
really isn’t, but is instead a much longer period of time
during which the child must wait for permanency
and the parent must be provided services. I am deeply
troubled by Judge Tacoma’s rationale for eliminating
the rule. He writes:
Often the rule is implicated in cases where the
child(ren) are the subject of neglect (such as a
parent’s persistent, treatment resistant drug abuse
or instability from transient meretricious relationships by a young mother so typical in these
cases) rather than active abuse, in which the long
term likelihood of building a successful family
should be considered on a case-by-case basis.47
There are two major ﬂaws in the judge’s reasoning.
First, as a technical matter, nothing in the current law
prohibits the court from considering those circumstances in a given case, so a change in the law is unnecessary. Indeed, at both the permanency planning
hearing and at a termination of parental rights hearing
these may be legitimate considerations.
Second, and more concerning on a policy level,
an utter lack of a statutory ending date for the application of services aimed at reuniﬁcation is a prescription for a return to the days of unending foster
50

care “limbo.” I ﬁnd particularly concerning the two
categories of cases the judge suggests illustrate the
need for a policy change: recalcitrant substance abuse
and parental immaturity. The ﬁrst of these may very
well be a lifelong struggle for the parent, and if the
problem is so severe that the state has stepped in to
remove the parent’s children, it will almost always take
years for the parent to establish sobriety and stability.
The only prescription for the second is waiting while
the parent matures and is able to function psychologically as a responsible adult, which, of course, may
never happen. But as I’ve already said, children don’t
wait in a state of suspended animation. They grow and
develop. For an adult, a year seems a short time, but a
child’s sense of time is very diﬀerent, and a year may
feel like an eternity to him or her.
Beyond these concerns, Judge Tacoma makes a
mistake that lawyers and judges often make—the attitude that “it’s just neglect” so we should give parents
more time. Legal professionals almost routinely discount the impact of neglect on children.48 But neglect
is very often the most diﬃcult form of child maltreatment to respond to. As the judge’s examples make
clear, many diﬀerent parenting problems fall under
the “neglect” rubric. A parent who is developmentally
delayed, mentally ill, substance addicted, and has lived
in a series of violent relationships and who cannot care
for his or her child as a result is said to have “neglected” his or her child.49 Obviously, co-morbidity of this
sort, which is very often present in cases of neglect,
presents extreme challenges for treatment providers.50
Moreover, because most parents who neglect their
children were themselves neglected as children, they
disproportionately consume limited public resources.51
More important than the diﬃculty of responding adequately to a parent who “neglects” her child is
the impact of parental neglect on children. What we
label “neglect” may have devastating consequences for
children. First, more children die each year as a result
of neglect than die as a result of abuse.52 Even when it
doesn’t result in death, neglect may have devastating
impacts on children’s development.53 For example,
neglect may negatively impact a child’s brain development and may cause delays in “cognitive, language
and academic skills.”54
Changing the 19b(5) “Presumption”

Judge Tacoma asserts that “the current presumption insisting on termination if the statutory grounds
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are proven should be reversed.”55 Because, in my view,
the court retains the necessary authority to decline
to terminate parental rights, I do not see a need to
change the current statutory scheme as it was interpreted in Trejo. If the lawyers are doing their jobs
properly—that is, zealously representing their clients—the court will be fully informed regarding the
relevant issues in the case.
In analyzing whether we should change subsection
19b(5), it is important to understand what a child
in such a case will have experienced by the time the
case reaches this point in the proceeding. A child who
sits on the threshold of termination of parental rights
has already suﬀered abuse, or, more likely, long-term,
serious neglect at the hands of his or her parent. That
parent and child should typically have received inhome services in the form of Family First, or a related
program, to preserve the family before a petition is
ﬁled with the court.56 After a petition is ﬁled, the parent will have admitted or the court will have found,
through the application of procedures meeting due
process standards, that the parent was in fact abusive
or neglectful. The court and agencies will have expended at least a year attempting to redress the issues
that brought the child to the court’s attention.
At this posture in the case, when parental unﬁtness has been demonstrated and parental inability or
unwillingness to engage in a serious way in services
aimed at rehabilitation, adding an aﬃrmative best
interest element to the petitioner’s burden will not
improve the quality of judicial decision-making for
the child. Moreover, such an added element, without regard to whatever speciﬁc best interest factors
the legislature or appellate courts might require be
examined, will ultimately not remove the subjective
nature of the decision. As Trejo makes clear—and as is
equally clear under the Child Custody Act best interest scheme—the ﬁnal decision on best interests will be
subjective. Giving judges the ability to postpone the
crucial decisions to be made will end up hurting more
children than it helps
What we should glean from our experience in
child welfare over the past three decades is that 1) it is
diﬃcult for people to change, and 2) the Department
of Human Services and courts make poor parents.
At the same time, children need stability and, to
the extent possible, a single set of caregivers. Thus,
children will generally be best served if their parents
are provided a time-limited opportunity to regain
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custody of them, and when that time expires, a judge
is required to make a series of very diﬃcult decisions
about that child’s future. Changing the law so that
judges can delay making these very diﬃcult decisions
will take the pressure oﬀ judges. But it will not serve
the interests of the largest number of children who
are in the foster care system. Adding an aﬃrmative
best-interest element to the burden on the petitioner
will predictably result in many more children spending years marking time in the foster care system while
their parents continue to be incapable of caring for
them. Many of the children so aﬄicted will become
unadoptable or ineligible for another permanent
resolution of their situation because they’ve waited too
long for permanency.
Expand Alternatives

By this point, it should be obvious that Judge
Tacoma and I view these matters very diﬀerently, so
it is gratifying to ﬁnd common ground. I wholeheartedly agree that we should constantly endeavor to ﬁnd
programs and processes that produce better outcomes
for children and families. The Permanency Planning
Mediation Pilot program is one such program.57
Other helpful programs include family-group decision-making, and team decision-making meetings
now employed by the Department of Human Services. Additionally, a bill currently pending before the
legislature could establish another useful option in
that it would provide for ﬁnancial assistance to a relative who becomes a child’s guardian.58 Illinois has, for
several years pursuant to a Title IV-E waiver, provided
for permanent, subsidized guardianship for a child in
the foster care system for whom the court has determined that adoption is not an available option.59
Best Interest Factors

Judge Tacoma asserts the need for a listing of best
interest factors similar to those applicable under the
Child Custody Act and to guardianship proceedings. He would prefer that the legislature or appellate
courts instruct the judges of this state what factors are
relevant to the best interest determination; I believe
the determination of what is relevant to the child’s
best interests in a particular case should be left to the
individual judge and made on a case-by-case basis.
Lawyers and judges should receive training regarding
the complexity of the best interest determination in
the context of child protective proceedings. That train-
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ing should include, at a minimum, information about
the normal course of child development and a child’s
various needs at each stage in the process, information
about the confounding and counterintuitive nature of
children’s behavior in the child welfare context,60 and
information about the need for interdisciplinary collaboration in determining what legal outcomes would
best serve a particular child’s interests. In addition to
this overarching criticism of the need for a set of articulated best interest factors, I have both general and
speciﬁc concerns about the use of best interest factors
in child protection cases.
In general, I do not see the need for a list of factors
to be established by either the legislature or appellate
courts when a trial court may look to the “whole record” in determining what will best serve a particular
child. One concern is that if a judge fails to articulate
a rationale regarding one such factor, appellate courts
will reverse or remand cases to the trial court to give
them the opportunity to address the factor.61 While
the Child Custody Act has contained a list of best
interest factors for decades, trial courts from time-totime still simply fail to address the factors.62 In a child
protection case in which the child resides in temporary care with no viable parent, such an outcome
would further delay the child’s search for a permanent
and stable family and would be seriously damaging
to the child. Moreover, having a set of factors that
trial courts must address does nothing to ensure that
judges will actually exercise their discretion wisely.63
In several places in this article I take issue with Judge
Tacoma’s interpretation of facts as they relate to a
child’s best interests. No set of best interest factors will
prepare a judge to confront the sometimes bewildering behavior of abused and neglected children—the
horribly abused child who professes undying love and
commitment to his abuser, the sexually abused child
who runs joyfully into the arms of the perpetrator.
Having registered general objections to the establishment of a list of factors, for the most part I think
that Judge Tacoma’s list of proposed factors are relevant and should typically be addressed by counsel for
each of the parties to a termination of parental rights
petition and by the court. I will very brieﬂy address
each of his proposed factors.
The Age of the Child

First, regarding the age of the child, I fully agree
that the age of the child should be considered in every
52

termination proceeding. Nothing in the current law
prohibits the court from doing so. I disagree that a
child who is 14 years of age or older should be permitted to veto a termination request as Judge Tacoma
advocates. I ﬁnd his reference to the common law’s
infancy rule in criminal cases entirely unpersuasive in
this context. I do agree that the expressed desires of
an older, and presumably more mature, minor should
be carefully considered, not least because under our
Adoption Code a child over 14 years of age must
consent to be adopted.64 I leave room, however, for
the possibility that termination of parental rights may
serve the interests of an older youth even if he or she
does not wish to be adopted. I have been involved in
cases, for instance, in which mental health professional
have testiﬁed that termination is necessary, even when
the child does not want such a result, to permit the
child to make progress psychologically. While these
cases are admittedly rare, it is certainly not rare that
adolescents cannot know what is best for them.
The Child’s Attitude Toward Termination

Judge Tacoma’s second factor would be the child’s
attitude toward termination. Again, as a general matter, I agree. Children’s expressed wishes should be
taken into consideration.65 Where I part company
with Judge Tacoma is the weight to be accorded the
statements of young children and how children’s behavior and statements should be interpreted. In arguing for this factor, Judge Tacoma cites a case in which
an 8-year-old child threatened to sabotage adoption
and to physically harm the judge by shooting him
and cutting his throat for terminating the rights of
the parent.66 Judge Tacoma concludes that this boy’s
reaction is evidence that termination of parental rights
was the wrong decision for the boy. But in my view,
this case does not illustrate why the case should not
have resulted in termination of parental rights. Rather,
it in fact supports the court’s termination decision.
Moreover, it illustrates how weighing children’s statements—and related behavior—about termination
can be confounding and contrary to their own best
interests. Children who have been abused and neglected for years—the boy to which Judge Tacoma refers
was seven at the time he came to the court’s attention
and eight at the time of termination—can learn to
model the parent’s unacceptable behavior and/or form
traumatic bonds with their abusive or neglectful parents. As Dr. Judith Cohen and Anthony Mannarion,
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Ph.D., leading researchers on the impact of trauma on
children have recently explained:
Modeling occurs when children who grow up
in abusive or violent homes and communities
have many opportunities to observe and learn
maladaptive behaviors and coping strategies.
They may also see those behaviors being rewarded repeatedly. For example, a child who experiences physical abuse and domestic violence
may erroneously conclude that anger and abuse
are accepted ways of coping with frustration. 67
Similarly, the fact that a child has a strong attachment to an abusive parent does not mean that that
attachment is healthy or that termination of parental
rights would not serve the child’s long-term interests.
Again, Drs. Cohen and Mannarino explain:
Traumatic bonding involves both modeling of
inappropriate behaviors and maladaptive attachment dynamics. It also involves acceptance
of inaccurate explanations for inappropriate behaviors. It has been described in the psychoanalytic literature as identiﬁcation with the aggressor and in law enforcement as the Stockholm
syndrome. . . . Such children may bond with
the violent parent out of self-preservation. To
manage the guilt and cognitive dissonance associated with turning against the victimized
parent, these children may adopt the violent
parent’s views, attitudes, and behaviors toward the victimized parent and become abusive or violent themselves. 68
Obviously, I am not a mental health professional
and no credible mental health professional would
suggest that these dynamics are at work in the case the
judge uses to illustrate his point without a comprehensive evaluation. My point is this: children’s reactions to
those who step in to help them overcome the damage
done by their abusive and neglectful life experiences
can be diﬃcult to understand and counterintuitive.
Lawyers and judges should always seek the advice of
competent mental health professionals when seeking
to understand children’s behavior and statements in
context.
The Type and Extent of Abuse or Neglect

Obviously, this should be considered. Again, nothing in current law prohibits the court from considering it as part of “the whole record.”69 The case that
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Judge Tacoma posits to illustrate the need to ensconce
this factor into law involves a young mother who
cannot maintain a home that is physically minimally
suitable or who lacks the ability to leave a “pernicious”
companion. That is, he laments the need to terminate
parental rights where a parent is merely neglectful.
As I have discussed earlier, in such a case, the mother
would have already been provided both in-home
services to prevent the need for removal and a year’s
worth of services to address her problems in functioning after the child entered foster care. I have already
addressed the devastating consequences that can ﬂow
from this sort of neglect. Reasonable questions would
be, “If this mother cannot maintain a clean house or
leave an abusive boyfriend, how is she going to be
even minimally successful at raising this child in a
reasonably healthy way? If she can’t do it now, when
will she be able to? How long must her children wait
for her to become more responsible? Will she ever?”
Probability that the Child Will Be Adopted

The clinic in which I work was recently involved
in a termination case, ﬁled because the court ordered
the petition at the conclusion of the permanency planning hearing, in which the children were 14 and 15
years old. The 14-year-old girl had behavioral problems that resulted in her placement in a residential
treatment facility. Similarly, her 15-year-old brother
was residing in a residential sex oﬀender treatment
program. The only viable parent was a father who had
been mostly absent for the children’s entire lives but
expressed an interest in continuing to work toward
regaining custody of his children. The girl had repeatedly indicated she did not want to see her father, but
a mental health expert explained that she had been
abandoned by everyone who should have loved and
cared for her, and her rejection of her father before he
could fully reject her was a means of protecting herself
from the pain of yet another outright rejection. After
hearing the evidence, the judge wisely determined
that termination was clearly not in the children’s best
interests, in part because the children had no viable
hope for adoption.
I fully believe the court made the correct decision
in this case. Obviously, the court did so under the
current regime governed by subsection 19b(5) and
Trejo. In such a case, it is critical for the lawyers to do
their jobs: investigate the case fully, develop a coherent theory of the case, present testimony to support
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the theory of the case, and make the most compelling
argument for the position taken. But when the court
is not satisﬁed that the lawyers have done so, family
court judges should not hesitate to use their extraordinary authority to fully develop the facts of the case to
make a fully informed decision.70
Economic Factors

While the case Judge Tacoma uses to illustrate his
perceived need for this factor is an aberration, I don’t
necessarily disagree with his suggestion that economic
impacts of termination on the children should be
considered. Current law permits this. I would caution practitioners to consider this factor very carefully
for two reasons. First, in the vast majority of cases,
children will be better oﬀ ﬁnancially if their natural
parents’ rights are terminated and they are adopted.
We should not ignore the fact that in most situations,
the children we remove come from poor families and
are placed with more middle-class families. Also, most
children who are adopted from the foster care system
are eligible for an adoption subsidy. A related question
is, “Who pays?” When a child is adopted and receives
both a support and medical subsidy, it is still cheaper
for the state than maintaining a child in temporary
foster care, so the state will typically beneﬁt economically when a parent’s rights are terminated and the
child adopted. These factors taken together may suggest a ﬁnancial reason to favor termination.
My second concern has to do with the potential
distorting impact of economic considerations on
judicial decision-making. Some years ago, before the
existence of subsection 19b(5), while working for a
legal aid oﬃce in Detroit, I was involved in a case
in which I represented a 10-year-old girl. The girl’s
mother suﬀered from long-standing and severe mental
health problems that were exacerbated by an addiction to drugs. The girl’s grandfather had established
a $30,000 trust fund for her that became eﬀective
upon his death. The court refused to terminate the
mother’s rights—the girl had no legal father—despite
the passage of nearly three years and the ﬁling of two
termination petitions. When I left the job with legal
aid, the child was still a temporary ward with no realistic hope to return to her mother, no hope of a new,
permanent family, not because she was unadoptable
(her foster parents wished to adopt), but because the
court would not terminate parental rights and extinguish the child’s rights to the trust fund. I don’t know
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if or how the case was resolved. I do know this: that
$30,000, if she ever got it, cost that child a lot.

Some Recommendations
Having disagreed with Judge Tacoma’s general
thesis and many of his speciﬁc recommendations, I
feel constrained to oﬀer some suggestions that I think
may address the problem of legal orphans, which, as
I have said, I agree with Judge Tacoma, is a very real
problem. While none of the suggestions I oﬀer require
changes in policy or statute, they do require substantial changes in practice.
First, we lawyers and judges handling child protection cases must educate ourselves in the very complex
medical and social welfare issues that are presented by
these cases. Throughout this article, I have attempted
to point out that these cases present complicated
human reactions to very unusual circumstances. We
must try to understand these issues so that we do not
jump to conclusions that make common sense, but
that are in fact wrong and potentially very damaging.
Speciﬁcally, we must focus on the impact of
complex trauma on children’s development. Most of
the children entering the child welfare system have
experienced more than a single traumatic event and
more than one type of trauma (e.g., abuse, neglect,
parental substance abuse, exposure to domestic violence between adults in the home), and we must try
to understand the eﬀects these multiple traumas have
on the individual child.71 By educating ourselves as
much as possible about these allied ﬁelds, we can
learn to ask the right questions and to know when
we should bring in other professionals to assist us in
our decision-making.
No matter how hard we work to understand the
intricate nature of the harm done to children by abuse
and neglect, we cannot hope to know in depth all the
medical and social welfare issues that even a relatively
straightforward case of child maltreatment presents.
So, my second suggestion is that communities develop and use trauma-informed multidisciplinary
teams (MDTs) to assess cases of child maltreatment.72
Michigan’s Child Protection Law has long required the
use of MDTs by the Department of Human Services,
but they are rarely used in practice.73 For this reason,
courts should take the lead in their communities in
developing these teams and insisting on their use.
MDTs bring together professionals from a num-
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ber of disciplines—e.g, medicine, law, social work,
psychology, psychiatry, education, and occupational
therapy—into a single body, which provides a multitude of perspectives on a particular case. Their use can
insulate decision-making from bias or prejudice and
can suggest new or diﬀerent service needs presented
by a particular case. MDTs can assist courts in case
decision-making. MDTs should be used early in the
handling of cases (before the court becomes involved
or immediately upon the ﬁling of a petition) and at
crucial decision-making points such as permanency
planning hearings. A recent study—conducted at the
Family Assessment Clinic at the University of Michigan School of Social Work—of the use of an MDT as
soon as protective services got involved in cases provides encouraging evidence that early application of
MDT services can keep children safely in their homes
longer and can help with expediting return of children
to their homes when removal is necessary.74
My third recommendation dovetails with my
second, and is not inconsistent with my next two
recommendations, although on ﬁrst impression that
may seem to be the case. When any petition is ﬁled,
all dispositional options should be on the table. If we
have conducted the sort of comprehensive evaluations
I have advocated for in recommendation number 2,
and conducted them early in CPS’s contact with the
family, the result should be a greater application of
services to the family before the case is brought to the
court, and more eﬀort to maintain the family unit.
Once a petition is ﬁled, we should seriously question the parents’ ability and willingness to use services
and to beneﬁt from them. I ﬁrmly believe that some
parents—many more than we are probably willing to
admit—simply cannot be habilitated or rehabilitated
in anything like a timeframe to meet the needs of
their children. But their children are our paramount
concern. Thus, in some substantial number of cases, if
we have comprehensive, early, multidisciplinary evaluations, we will learn that regardless of what services
we oﬀer, we will not see the change necessary to safely
reunify the family. In those cases, we should focus exclusively on the needs of the children for permanency
and should use the provisions of Michigan law that
allow termination of parental rights (or other permanency options) at the ﬁst dispositional hearing.75
Too often we engage in a year(s)-long, empty
exercise of oﬀering services to families that, if we were
honest with ourselves, we would recognize either
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cannot or will not beneﬁt from those services. This
wastes our very limited resources and deprives families
that could beneﬁt from more intensive application of
professional attention. This helps nobody and actively
hurts some children. While we go through the steps of
providing services to parents we can reasonably predict
will not beneﬁt from them, their children grow older,
develop more problems from the instability of foster
care, and too many become unadoptable in the process.
Fourth, the time to think seriously about the
consequences of subsection 19b(5), Trejo, and the
one-year permanency planning rule is not at the time
of the permanency planning hearing or the time the
termination petition is ﬁled, but at the time the petition seeking temporary jurisdiction is ﬁled, and at
every hearing following the ﬁling.
Preliminary hearings have too often become pro
forma proceedings the results of which are a foregone
conclusion. They are too often seen as an opportunity to see that the correct boxes on a form order are
checked to ensure that federal dollars continue to
ﬂow into our child welfare system. This is not their
purpose. At the preliminary hearing, we should be
thinking very carefully about the case before the court.
The court should be demanding at these hearings that
the agency ﬁling the petition be able to explain what
“reasonable eﬀorts” were made to prevent the removal
of the children from the home. We should think carefully about whether removal from the parent’s home
is really necessary, and should also take more seriously
the question whether custody of the child by the parent is truly “contrary to the welfare” of the child.76
“What is the permanency plan for the children who
are the subject of the petition?” is a question we—and
the court—should ask at every preliminary hearing.
When reuniﬁcation is the articulated goal, the court
should carefully scrutinize the treatment plan and
reject the sort of boilerplate treatment plans that are so
prevalent. Are there services that could keep the child
safely in the home? Can the court render the child’s
home safe by ordering the oﬀending person from the
home?77 In short, courts should focus more closely
on whether reasonable eﬀorts have in fact been made
before determining that children should be removed.
Finally, courts should consider whether asserting
jurisdiction over children but maintaining them in
their family home subject to “reasonable terms and
conditions” is the best option in a particular case.78
Similarly, in some cases it may make sense to return
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children to their parents’ custody knowing that the
family will continue under court supervision for an
extended period of time.79 In short, lawyers, courts,
caseworkers, and agencies must get more creative at
crafting dispositions that will keep children safe, will
nurture their well-being, and which will seek to rely
less reﬂexively on out-of-home care.

Conclusion
Judge Kenneth Tacoma has identiﬁed a real problem of current child welfare practice in Michigan. The
excessive number of legal orphans. His prescription,
however, runs the very real risk of causing even more
severe problems for a larger number of children in the
foster care system, a return to the never-ending road
of foster care “limbo” and foster care “drift.” While
our current statutory structure is far from perfect,
every change in it will inevitably have unexpected
consequences and predictable but unfortunate consequences for the young people it is designed to serve.
Although imperfect, Michigan’s current law provides
practicing judges and lawyers enough ﬂexibility to
craft a response to each case that can meet the needs
of the children who come to the court’s attention.
Developing such case-speciﬁc planning will require
leadership by courts and a refocusing of the use of our
resources. To best serve children and families, we must
use all of the tools aﬀorded us in the relevant statutes
and court rules, and we must train lawyers and judges
to use the right tool at the right time. 

Endnotes
1 I want to thank Donald N. Duquette and Vivek Sankaran for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of
this article.
Robert Earl Keen, Jr., The Road Goes on Forever and the
Party Never Ends, on NO. 2 LIVE DINNER, (Sugar
Hill Records, 1996).

a decade of misuse of family preservation programs, the
death of numerous children, and empirical evidence
demonstrating that the eﬃcacy of family preservation
programs had been overrated, he spoke out against their
misuse.
7

585 N.W.2d 326 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).

8

42 U.S.C. 671(A)(15).

9 See Kenneth L. Tacoma, Lost And Alone On Some
Forgotten Highway: ASFA, Binsfeld, and the Law of
Unintended Consequences, which appears earlier in this
issue of the Michigan Child Welfare Law Journal.
10 See In re Trejo, 612 N.W.2d 407, 414 (Mich.
2000)(“Subsection 19b(5) attempts to strike the difﬁcult balance between the policy favoring the preservation of the family unit and that of protecting a child’s
right and need for security and permanency.”).
11 See generally, In re JK, 661 N.W.2d 216, 223 (Mich.
2003)(“the parent’s compliance with the parent-agency
agreement is evidence of her ability to provide proper
care and custody”); see also In re Gazella, 692 N.W.2d
708 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005)(parent must beneﬁt from
services and not merely comply).
12 See David P.H. Jones, The Untreatable Family, 11 Child
Abuse & Neglect 409 (1987)(discussing in depth the
substantial numbers of parents in child protection cases
that cannot beneﬁt from treatment); Anne Harris Cohn
& Deborah Daro, Is Treatment Too Late: What Ten
Years of Evaluative Research Tells Us, 11 Child Abuse &
Neglect 433 (1987)(noting that one-third of parents in
treatment for child abuse reabuse their children while in
treatment and that “over one-half of the families served
continued to be judged likely to mistreat their children
following termination [of treatment]”).
13 Mich. Comp. Laws § 712A.19a(6).
14 See In re JK, 661 N.W.2d 216 (Mich. 2003)(prohibiting agencies and courts from proceeding with adoption
proceedings after termination of parental rights until
appeals are exhausted).
15 Mich. Comp. Laws § 712A.18(4) Before the resolution
of the allegations in the petition alleging child maltreatment, the parent’s participation in a treatment plan is
voluntary unless the court orders otherwise. Mich. Ct.
R. 3.965(E)(2).

2

Michigan’s Child Protection Law, Mich. Comp. Laws
§§ 722.621-738 and Juvenile Code, Mich. Comp. Laws
§§ 712A.1-32.

3

431 U.S. 816 (1977).

4

455 U.S. 745 (1982).

5

See DeShaney v Winnebago County Department of Social
Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).

17 Mich. Comp. Laws § 712A.19a(7)(b).

6

See generally, Richard Gelles, The Book Of David:
How Preserving Families Can Cost Children’s Lives
(Basic Books 1997). Gelles was an early proponent of
the family preservation movement. But after more than

19 Id.

56

16 Mich. Comp. Laws § 712A.19b(5) provides: “If the
court ﬁnds that there are grounds for termination of
parental rights, the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that additional eﬀorts for reuniﬁcation of the child with the parent not be made. . . .”
18 See 42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(E).
20 Id.

Spring 2007
21 The cases excepted from application of this provision,
those addressed in 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D), is that
narrow group of cases in which the ASFA mandates that
the state make no eﬀorts to reunify the family and instead immediately pursue termination of parental rights.
22 Permanent foster family agreements are deﬁned in
Mich. Comp. Laws § 712A.13a(1)(i).
23 Mich. Comp. Laws § 712A.19(4).
24 42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(E).
25 42 U.S.C. § 678.
26 E.g., the juvenile court rules require that the court
inquire at the preliminary hearing whether relatives are
available to take placement of a child whom the court
orders removed. Mich. Ct. R. 3.965(B)(13). See also
Mich. Comp. Laws § 954a(2)(a provision of the Foster
Care and Adoption Services Act which requires the state
or its contract agencies to identify and evaluate relatives
for placement within 30 days of the child’s placement).
27 See CFF 722-3 at p. 5; available at: www.mﬁa.state.
mi.us/olmwed/ex/cﬀ/722-3.pdf
28 See Mich. Comp. Laws § 712A.13a(1)(j)(deﬁning “relative” for placement purposes at the preliminary hearing) and Mich. Comp. Laws § 712A.18(1)(b)(deﬁning
those who are “related” too a child for purposes of
dispositional order).
29 Mich. Comp. Laws § 712A.18(1)(h).
30 Id.
31 Mich. Comp. Laws § 712A.19(4).
32 Mich. Comp. Laws § 712A.19(1).
33 I note a minor error in Judge Tacoma’s article which,
I think, illustrates a broader misunderstanding of the
history of child welfare law in Michigan. He implies by
the subtitle of his article, “ASFA, Binsfeld, and the Law
of Unintended Consequences,” that the provisions of
Mich. Comp. Laws § 712A.19b(5) to which he objects
were part of Michigan’s Binsfeld legislation and a part of
the response to federal Adoption and Safe Families Act
(ASFA). The ASFA was signed into law in November
1997. Most of the Binsfeld provisions were enacted in
two waves, the ﬁrst in December 1997 and the second
in December 1998. Section 19b(5), however, was enacted in 1994 in response to diﬀerent pressures.
34 In re Trejo, 612 N.W.2d 407 (Mich. 2000).
35 Id at 413. See In re Hall-Smith, 564 N.W.2d 156
(Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
36 Trejo at 414.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 413.
40 Id. at 415.
41 See Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.638.

z

42 Tacoma, supra.
43 See In Our Hands: Report Of The Binsfeld Children’s
Commission 36-37 (1996).
44 Michigan law has long provided that any petition in a
child protection proceeding can request termination of
parental rights at the ﬁrst dispositional hearing. Mich.
Comp. Laws § 712A.19b(4).
45 The DeShaney case is but one example of how the “reasonable eﬀorts” requirement was distorted in the 1980s
and much of the 1990s. In practice, “reasonable eﬀorts”
was interpreted as “every conceivable eﬀort.” In one case
handled by the Legal Aid and Defender Association of
Detroit in the early 1990s, the agency refused to remove
the children from the home so the court ordered “in
home” services. Those “in home” services were actually
being provided at a local fast food restaurant because
the agency determined that the family home was too
dangerous for its workers to enter. But they insisted it
was not too dangerous for the toddlers who were the
subjects of the case to be left in.
46 See Jones, The Untreatable Family, supra note 12.
47 Tacoma supra.
48 See, e.g., Martin Guggenheim, How Children’s Lawyers
Serve State Interests, 6 Nevada L. Rev. 805 (2006); Sarah
H. Ramsey, The United States Child Protective System—A
Triangle of Tensions, 13 Child And Family L. Q. 25, 2728 (2001).
49 For a brief but helpful discussion of the challenge of
co-morbidity in child welfare practice, see Department
Of Health And Human Services, Blending Perspectives
And Building Common Ground: A Report To Congress On Substance Abuse And Child Protection 59-62
(1999) (discussing the high rates of co-morbidity of
parental substance abuse, mental illness and domestic
violence); see also, Carol T. Mowbray, et al, Women
With Severe Mental Disorders: Issues and Service Needs, in
Women’s Mental Helath Services: A Public Health Perspective 175 (Bruce Lobutsky Levin, Andrea K. Blanche
& Ann Jennings, Eds., 1998) (discussing numerous
social problems that are often co-morbid with mental
illness).
50 Id.
51 Hendrika B. Cantwell, The Neglect of Child Neglect,
in The Battered Child 347, 363-367 (Mary Edna
Helfer, Ruth S. Kempe & Richard D. Krugman, eds.,
1997)(discussing the treatment needs of neglectful
parents).
52 Id. at 347 (“It must be emphasized that more children
in the United States die from neglect than from physical
abuse.”); see also Michigan Child Death State Advisory
Team Fifth Annual Report, Child Deaths in Michigan
2005 142 (“In 2002, NCANDS reported that child
maltreatment fatalities were most often the result of
neglect (38%) followed by physical abuse (30%) and
then a combination of maltreatment types (29%));.

57

z

The Michigan Child Welfare Law Journal

53 See, e.g., Michael D. DeBellis, The Psychobiology of
Neglect, 10 Child Maltreatment 150 (2005)(“neglected
children may suﬀer from various subtypes of neglect
and many other adversities, which may contribute to
adverse brain development and compromised neuropsychological and psychosocial outcomes”).
54 Tiﬀany Watts-English, et al., The Psychobiology of Maltreatment in Childhood, 62 J. Of Social Issues, 717, 728
(2006).
55 Tacoma, supra. I have already discussed the judge’s
assertion that subsection 19b(5) creates a presumption
and will not repeat that argument in the body of the
text here.
56 It is, of course, the court’s responsibility to ensure that
“reasonable eﬀorts” to preserve the family have been
made in most cases. Mich. Ct. R. 3.965(D)(1).
57 See Gary R. Anderson & Peg Whalen, Permanency
Planning Mediation Pilot Program: Evaluation Final
Report (2004).
58 See Senate Bill 170. Available at www.michiganlegislature .org.
59 705 ILCS 405/2-27.
60 See discussion infra.
61 See Arndt v Kasem, 353 N.W.2d 497 (Mich. Ct. App.
1984) (“It is well settled that when deciding a custody
matter the trial court must evaluate each of the factors
contained in the Child Custody Act . . . and state a conclusion on each, thereby determining the best interests
of the child. The failure to make such speciﬁc ﬁndings is
reversible error.”)(citations omitted).
62 See, e.g., Harvey v Harvey, 680 N.W.2d 835 (Mich.
2004)(where the parties agreed to binding arbitration
regarding a child custody dispute and the court, pursuant to the arbitration, entered a custody order, the case
was remanded for ﬁnding regarding the child custody
factors).
63 See, e.g., Foskett v Foskett, 634 N.W.2d 363 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2001)(where the court made custody decision
based on mere allegations that were not supported by
evidence and which was later revered by the appellate
court).
64 Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.43(2).
65 Of course, the minor’s lawyer-guardian ad litem is
generally required to communicate to the court
the child’s expressed wishes. Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 712A.17d(1)(i). Also, the court may appoint an
“attorney” to represent the child’s expressed wishes
when they conﬂict with the lawyer-guardian ad litem’s
understanding of what would best serve the child’s
interests. Mich. Comp. Laws § 712A.17d(2).

58

66 See Judge Tacoma’s article, footnote 21 and accompanying text.
67 Judith A. Cohen, Anthony P. Mannarino & Ester
Deblinger, Treating Trauma And Traumatic Grief In
Children And Adolescents 9 (2006).
68 Id at 10.
69 Trejo, 612 N.W.2d at 415.
70 Mich. Ct. R. 3.923(A) permits the court to question
witnesses, call witnesses, or adjourn a case to subpoena
additional witnesses or for the purposes of producing
evidence (e.g., additional evaluations of the children or
parents).
71 See Traumatic Stress/Child Welfare, Volume 21 Focal Point (2007). Focal Point is the newsletter of the
Research & Training Center on Family Support and
Children’s Mental Health, Portland State University,
Portland, Oregon. The Winter 2007 volume of the
newsletter addresses traumatic stress in the child welfare
system and can be accessed at: www.rtc.pdx.edu/pgFPW07TOC.php
72 See Elena Cohen, Dona T. Hornsby & Steven Priester,
Assessment of Children, Youth, and Families in the Child
Welfare System, in Child Welfare For The 21st Century:
A Handbook Of Practice, Policies, And Programs 87
(2005).
73 See Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.629(1).
74 Kathleen Coulborn Faller, Mary B. Ortega & Elaine
Pomeranz, Can Early Assessment Make a Diﬀerence in
Child Protection? Results From a Pilot Study, J. Of Public
Child Welfare (forthcoming 2007).
75 See Mich. Comp. Laws § 712A.19b(4).
76 Mich. Ct. R. 3.965(C)(2).
77 Mich. Comp. Laws § 712A.13a(4).
78 Mich. Ct. R. 3.965(B)(12)(a).
79 Mich. Ct. R. 3.974.

